| | 32004L0018: c3-38.8Urgency    
| 32004L0018 - Classic (3rd generation) | Article 38.8 | 8. In the case of restricted procedures and negotiated procedures with publication of a contract notice referred to in Article 30, where urgency renders impracticable the time limits laid down in this Article, contracting authorities may fix:
(a) a time limit for the receipt of requests to participate which may not be less than 15 days from the date on which the contract notice was sent, or less than 10 days if the notice was sent by electronic means, in accordance with the format and procedure for sending notices indicated in point 3 of Annex VIII;
(b) and, in the case of restricted procedures, a time limit for the receipt of tenders which shall be not less than 10 days from the date of the invitation to tender. | | 31993L0037 - Works (2nd generation) | Article 14.1 | Article 14
1. In cases where urgency renders impracticable the time limits laid down in Article 13, the contracting authorities may fix the following time limits:
(a) a time limit for receipt of requests to participate which shall be not less than 15 days from the date of dispatch of the notice;
(b) a time limit for the receipt of tenders which shall be not less than 10 days from the date of the invitation to tender. | | 31993L0036 - Goods (2nd generation) | Article 12.1 | Article 12
1. In cases where urgency renders impracticable the time limits laid down in Article 11, the contracting authorities may fix the following time limits:
(a) a time limit for the receipt of requests to participate which shall not be less than 15 days from the date of dispatch of the notice;
(b) a time limit for the receipt of tenders which shall not be less than 10 days from the date of the invitation to tender. | | 31992L0050 - Services (2nd generation) | Article 20.1 | Article 20
1. In cases where urgency renders impracticable the time limits laid down in Article 19, the contracting authorities may fix the following time limits:
(a) a time limit for receipt of requests to participate which shall be not less than 15 days from the date of dispatch of the notice;
(b) a time limit for the receipt of tenders which shall be not less than 10 days from the date of the invitation to tender. | | 31971L0305 - Works (1st generation) | Article 15.1 | Article 15
In cases where urgency tenders impracticable the time limits laid down in the preceding article, the authorities awarding contracts may apply the shorter time limits specified below:
- a time limit for the receipt of requests to participate which shall be not less than twelve days from the date of sending the notice
- a time limit for the receipt of tenders which shall be not less than ten days from the date of the invitation to tender. | | 31989L0440 - Fourth amendment of Works (1st generation) | Article 1.12=W1-15.1 | Article 15
1. In cases where urgency renders impracticable the time limits laid down in Article 14, the contracting authorities may fix the following time limits:
(a) a time limit for receipt of requests to participate which shall be not less than 15 days from the date of dispatch of the notice;
(b) a time limit for the receipt of tenders which shall be not less than 10 days from the date of the invitation to tender. | | 31977L0062 - Goods (1st generation) | Article 12.1 | Article 12
1. In cases where urgency renders impracticable the time limits laid down in article 11, the contracting authorities may fix the following time limits:
(a) a time limit for the receipt of requests to participate which shall be not less than 12 days from the date of dispatch of the notice
(b) a time limit for the receipt of tenders which shall be not less than 10 days from the date of the invitation to tender. | | 31988L0295 - Second amendment of Goods (1st generation) | Article 12=G1-12.1 | Article 12
Article 12 (1) is replaced by the following:
1. Where urgency renders impracticable the time limits referred to in Article 11, the contracting authorities may fix the following time limits:
(a) a time limit for the receipt of requests to participate which shall not be less than 15 days from the date of dispatch of the notice;
(b) a time limit for the receipt of tenders which shall not be less than 10 days from the date of the invitation to tender. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | C-126/03
Germany | 22 | S2-20.1
S2-32.2.c
S2.32.2.h | 22. The German Government also argues that it would have been impossible in practice to award the contract at issue in accordance with Titles III to VI of Directive 92/50, inasmuch as, in order to demonstrate its technical capability for the purposes of Article 32(2)(c) and (h) of that directive when the invitation to tender was issued by AWG DonauWald, the City of Munich needed to communicate the name of its subcontractor at the time its offer was lodged. In that regard it is true that a service provider which, with a view to being admitted to participate in a tendering procedure, intends to rely on the resources of entities or undertakings with which it is directly or indirectly linked must establish that it actually has available to it the resources of those entities or undertakings which are necessary for the performance of the contract but which it does not itself own (see, to that effect, Case C-176/98 Holst Italia [1999] ECR I-8607, paragraph 29; Case C-399/98 Ordine degli Architetti and Others [2001] ECR I-5409, paragraph 92; and Case C-314/01 Siemens and ARGE Telekom & Partner [2004] ECR I0000, paragraph 44). However, in the present case, it would in any event have been possible for the City of Munich to undertake an accelerated restricted procedure under Article 20 of Directive 92/50 between the issuing of the invitation to tender and the lodging of its offer. | | C-24/91 | 13-14 | W1-9.1.d
W1-15.1 | It should first be observed that the conditions for the application of Article 9(d) are concurrent. Consequently, if one of those conditions is not satisfied, the authorities awarding contracts may not derogate from the provisions of the directive, in particular those relating to advertising.
In the present case the extreme urgency relied on by the Spanish Government was not incompatible with the time-limits provided for in the context of the accelerated procedure under Article 15 of the directive. | | 10/76 | 7 | W1-14.1
W1-15.1
W1-16-17 | The Italian law does not contain the provisions referred to in articles 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the directive concerning the time-limit for the receipt of requests to participate, the form required for tenders and the compulsory indication of the time-limit for the completion of the works put out to tender. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | N-050311
MT Højgaard | 23+26+K15 | W2-14.1 | 23. Indklagedes iværksættelse af udbudet i form af hasteprocedure var begrundet med, at indklagede ellers ikke kunne overholde nogle tidsterminer, der skulle overholdes for at opnå forskellige offentlige tilskud. Klagenævnet forstår indklagedes angivelser sådan, at de offentlige tilskud var en forudsætning for arbejdets udførelse, og at det derfor ikke var muligt at overholde Bygge- og anlægsdirektivets almindelige tidsfrister for udbud, hvorfor hasteprocedure var nødvendig.
24. Grunden til, at indklagede ikke iværksatte udbudet tidligere under overholdelse af direktivets almindelige tidsfrister, var efter sagens oplysninger, at indklagede først blev opmærksom på pligten til EU-udbud så sent, at man ikke kunne nå at iværksætte et udbud under overholdelse af de almindelige tidsfrister. Det skyldtes således indklagede selv, at hasteproceduren var en nødvendig forudsætning for arbejdets udførelse.
25. Efter Bygge- og anlægsdirektivets artikel 14, stk. 1, er det en betingelse for hasteprocedure, at det ikke er muligt at overholde de almindelige tidsfrister for udbud. Dette kan ikke forstås som sigtende til tilfælde, hvor det som i den foreliggende sag skyldes ordregiveren selv, at de almindelige tidsfrister ikke kan overholdes. I modsat fald kunne enhver ordregiver bevidst bringe sig i en situation, hvor betingelserne for hasteprocedure efter artikel 14, stk. 1, (nu artikel 38, stk. 8 i direktiv 2004/18) er opfyldt, hvilket ville stride mod direktivets formål og bestemmelsens karakter af en undtagelsesbestemmelse. Denne forståelse af bestemmelsen bekræftes af, at det tydeligvis er EF-domstolens holdning, at undtagelsesbestemmelser i udbudsdirektiverne skal fortolkes snævert, jf. fx EFdomstolens domme af 14. september 2004 i sag C-385/02, Kommissionen mod Italien, og 14. oktober 2004 i sag C-340/02, Kommissionen mod Frankrig.
26. Klagenævnet konstaterer herefter, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Byggeog anlægsdirektivets artikel 14, stk. 1, som angivet i spørgsmål 20.
.....
K15. Indklagede har handlet i strid med Bygge- og anlægsdirektivets artikel 14, stk.1, ved at i værksætte det udbud, som sagen angår, i form af hasteprocedure, selvom bestemmelsens betingelser herfor ikke var opfyldt. | N-960123-1
Praktiserende Arkitekters Råd | 1 | S2-20.1 | 1. Efter det, der er oplyst over for Klagenævnet, var Glostrup Kommune, da kommunalbestyrelsen den 9. marts 1994 traf beslutning om udbygning af Skovvangsskolen, bekendt med, at udbygningen af skolen krævede vedtagelse af en lokalplan, og at lokalplanforslaget skulle udarbejdes bl.a. på grundlag af det vindende dispositionsforslag, således at arbejdet med lokalplanforslaget først kunne påbegyndes, når udbudsproceduren efter tjenesteydelsesdirektivet var afsluttet. Selvom det lægges til grund, at det var magtpåliggende for kommunen, at 1. etape af skoleudbygningen kunne være klar til skoleårets start i august 1996, kunne alene den omstændighed, at der skulle udarbejdes en lokalplan, ikke begrunde, at kommunen ved gennemførelsen af udbudsproceduren anvendte reglerne i tjenesteydelsesdirektivets artikel 20 om »Hastende tilfælde«. Klagenævnet træffer derfor afgørelse i overensstemmelse med klagerens påstand 1. | N-960123-1
Praktiserende Arkitekters Råd | 3 | S2-20.1 | 3. Da Klagenævnet – ligesom parterne – finder, at der er sket en overtrædelse af den pågældende fristregel, træffer Klagenævnet afgørelse i overensstemmelse med klagerens påstand 3.
[Påstand 3: Under forudsætning af, at Glostrup Kommune var berettiget til at foretage udbud efter reglerne om hastende udbud, skal Klagenævnet fastslå, at bestemmelsen i direktivets artikel 20, stk. 1, litra a, er tilsidesat, idet fristen for modtagelse af anmodning om at deltage var fastsat til den 7. juli 1994, uagtet fristen skal være mindst 15 dage fra tidspunktet for afsendelsen af bekendtgørelsen, dvs. 15 dage fra den 23. juni 1994 nemlig den 8. juli 1994.] |
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