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ECT-87-88

State aid

EU Law Community DK Law EU Cases DK Cases

EU Law

[See also C3-55.3]

ECT Article 87+88
Article 87
    1. Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.
    2. The following shall be compatible with the common market:
    (a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned;
    (b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences;
    (c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division.
    3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the common market:
    (a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment;
    (b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
    (c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;
    (d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest;
    (e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.
Article 88
    1. The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member States, keep under constant review all systems of aid existing in those States. It shall propose to the latter any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or by the functioning of the common market.
    2. If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a State or through State resources is not compatible with the common market having regard to Article 87, or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of time to be determined by the Commission.
    If the State concerned does not comply with this decision within the prescribed time, the Commission or any other interested State may, in derogation from the provisions of Articles 226 and 227, refer the matter to the Court of Justice direct.
    On application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unanimously, decide that aid which that State is granting or intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with the common market, in derogation from the provisions of Article 87 or from the regulations provided for in Article 89, if such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances. If, as regards the aid in question, the Commission has already initiated the procedure provided for in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the fact that the State concerned has made its application to the Council shall have the effect of suspending that procedure until the Council has made its attitude known.
    If, however, the Council has not made its attitude known within three months of the said application being made, the Commission shall give its decision on the case.
    3. The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compatible with the common market having regard to Article 87, it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.

EU Cases

Case PteRef Text
C-94/99
ARGE
24-32S2-1.c
S2-3.2
ECT-87-88-impl
24 The Court must observe that, as the Bundesvergabeamt has noted, the contracting authority is bound, under Directive 92/50, to observe the principle of equal treatment of tenderers. Under Article 3(2) of the directive, contracting authorities are to ensure that there is no discrimination between different service providers.
25 Nevertheless, as the Austrian and French Governments and the Commission have argued, the mere fact that contracting authorities allow bodies which receive subsidies enabling them to submit tenders at prices appreciably lower than those of the other, unsubsidised, tenderers, to take part in a procedure for the award of a public procurement contract does not amount to a breach of the principle of equal treatment.
26 If the Community legislature had intended to require contracting authorities to exclude such tenderers, it would have stated this explicitly.
27 Articles 23 and 29 to 37 of Directive 92/50 lay down detailed criteria for the selection of service providers permitted to submit a tender and the criteria for the award of the contract, but none of those provisions provides that tenderers may be excluded or their tenders rejected simply because they receive public subsidies.
28 On the contrary, Article 1(c) of Directive 92/50 expressly authorises the participation, in a procedure for the award of a public procurement contract, of bodies funded in some cases out of the public purse. It provides that a tenderer means a service provider which has submitted a tender and defines that provider as any natural or legal person, including a public body, which offers its services.
29 While it is not, therefore, contrary in itself to the principle of equal treatment of tenderers for public bodies to take part in a procedure for the award of public procurement contracts, even in circumstances such as those described in the first question, it is not excluded that, in certain specific circumstances, Directive 92/50 requires, or at the very least allows, the contracting authorities to take into account the existence of subsidies, and in particular of aid incompatible with the Treaty, in order, where appropriate, to exclude tenderers in receipt of such aid.
30 The Commission correctly states in this connection that a tenderer may be excluded from a selection procedure where the contracting authority considers that it has received aid incompatible with the Treaty and that the obligation to repay illegal aid would threaten its financial well-being, so that that tenderer may be regarded as unable to offer the necessary financial or economic security.
31 However, in order to answer the question of principle raised in the main proceedings, it is neither necessary nor indeed possible, having regard to the contents of the case-file, to define the conditions in which contracting authorities would be bound, or entitled, to exclude tenderers which receive subsidies.
32 In answer to the first question it is, therefore, sufficient to state that the mere fact that the contracting authority allows bodies receiving subsidies of any kind, whether from that contracting authority or from other authorities, which enable them to submit tenders at prices appreciably lower than those of the other, unsubsidised, tenderers to take part in a procedure for the award of a public service contract does not amount to a breach of the principle of equal treatment laid down in Directive 92/50.

DK Cases

Case PteRefText
N-071107
SJ
12-13+K1C3-2-parallel
ECT-87-88-impl
ECT-EquTran-impl
KNL2-1
Ad påstand 5
    12. Som anført af indklagede ligger det uden for Klagenævnets kompetence at tage stilling til, om Den Danske Stat i strid med Traktaten eller med andre fællesskabsretlige regler har ydet statsstøtte til DSB. Det ligger derimod inden for Klagenævnets kompetence at tage stilling til, om en dansk offentlig ordregivende myndighed under et udbud, som ikke er omfattet af Udbudsdirektivet, har handlet i strid med fællesskabsretten vedrørende indgåelse af offentlige kontrakter. Det vil kunne tænkes, at der under et udbud foreligger omstændigheder, der viser eller indicerer, at en tilbudsgiver har modtaget ulovlig statsstøtte, og Klagenævnet vil i en sådan situation efterfølgende kunne skulle tage stilling til, om det må antages, at fællesskabsretten for indgåelse af offentlige kontrakter i en sådan situation kræver en særlig adækvat adfærd fra den offentlige ordregiver[s] side, og om ordregiveren har opfyldt sådanne krav. Klagenævnet tager derfor ikke indklagedes påstand om afvisning til følge. På baggrund af det, som Klagenævnet har anført ad påstand 1 a og påstand 1 b, er der intet grundlag for at fastslå, at tilbudet fra Kystbanen A/S var et urealistisk lavt tilbud.
    13. Allerede som følge heraf tager Klagenævnet ikke denne påstand til følge.
    .....
    K1. Klagen tages ikke til følge.
    [Påstand 5 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med EUudbudsreglerne ved ikke at have foretaget tilstrækkelige undersøgelser med henblik på at konstatere, om det skyldes ulovlig statsstøtte fra Den Danske Stat til DSB, at Kystbanen A/S kunne afgive et tilbud, der var urealistisk lavt.]
N-050902
Tipo Danmark
22-23S2-3.2-impl
ECT-87-88-impl
ECT-EquTran
22. Efter det oplyste er der hverken grundlag for at fastslå, at NOVA modtager støtte fra den norske stat, som giver denne tilbudsgiver mulighed for at afgive bud, der ligger væsentlig under budene fra de øvrige tilbudsgivere, eller at der i øvrigt foreligger sådanne særlige omstændigheder, som indebærer en overtrædelse af det EU-retlige ligebehandlingsprincip, jf. herved EF-domstolens dom af 7. december 2000 i sag C-94/99, ARGE.
    23. Påstanden tages derfor ikke til følge.
    [Påstand 3 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med det EU-retlige ligebehandlingsprincip ved at tage tilbudet fra NOVA Instituttet for Barn med Utviklingsforstyrrelser A/S i betragtning, uanset at denne tilbudsgiver modtager støtte fra den norske stat.]
N-981021
Farum Industrirenovation
5+K3KNL1C1-1.1-impl
ECT-88
5. For så vidt angår spørgsmålet om en eventuel ulovlig støtte i strid med EU– Traktatens artikel 93 finder Klagenævnet sig alene beføjet til at fastslå, at indklagede burde have foretaget den foreskrevne anmeldelse.
    K3. Det pålægges indklagede, Københavns Kommune at foretage anmeldelse i overensstemmelse med EU–Traktatens artikel 93.