| | 32004L0018: c3-45.2.1May be excluded    
| 32004L0018 - Classic (3rd generation) | Article 45.2.1 | 2. Any economic operator may be excluded from participation in a contract where that economic operator:
(a) is bankrupt or is being wound up, where his affairs are being administered by the court, where he has entered into an arrangement with creditors, where he has suspended business activities or is in any analogous situation arising from a similar procedure under national laws and regulations;
(b) is the subject of proceedings for a declaration of bankruptcy, for an order for compulsory winding up or administration by the court or of an arrangement with creditors or of any other similar proceedings under national laws and regulations;
(c) has been convicted by a judgment which has the force of res judicata in accordance with the legal provisions of the country of any offence concerning his professional conduct;
(d) has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by any means which the contracting authorities can demonstrate;
(e) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which he is established or with those of the country of the contracting authority;
(f) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of taxes in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which he is established or with those of the country of the contracting authority;
(g) is guilty of serious misrepresentation in supplying the information required under this Section or has not supplied such information. | | 31993L0037 - Works (2nd generation) | Article 24.1 | Chapter 2
Criteria for qualitative selection
Article 24
Any contractor may be excluded from participation in the contract who:
(a) is bankrupt or is being wound up, whose affairs are being administered by the court, who has entered into an arrangement with creditors, who has suspended business activities or who is in any analogous situation arising from a similar procedure under national laws and regulations;
(b) is the subject of proceedings for a declaration of bankruptcy, for an order for compulsory winding up or administration by the court or for an arrangement with creditors or of any other similar proceedings under national laws or regulations;
(c) has been convicted of an offence concerning his professional conduct by a judgment which has the force of res judicata;
(d) has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proved by any means which the contracting authorities can justify;
(e) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which he is established or with those of the country of the contracting authority;
(f) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of taxes in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which he is established or those of the country of the contracting authority;
(g) is guilty of serious misrepresentation in supplying the information required under this Chapter. | | 31993L0036 - Goods (2nd generation) | Article 20.1 | Chapter 2
Criteria for qualitative selection
Article 20
1. Any supplier may be excluded from participation in the contract who:
(a) is bankrupt or is being wound up, whose affairs are being administered by the court, who has entered into an arrangement with creditors, who has suspended business activities or who is any analogous situation arising from a similar procedure under national laws and regulations;
(b) is the subject of proceedings for a declaration of bankruptcy, for an order for compulsory winding up or administration by the court or for an arrangement with creditors or of any other similar proceedings under national laws and regulations;
(c) has been convicted of an offence concerning his professional conduct by a judgment which has the force of res judicata;
(d) has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by any means which the contracting authorities can justify;
(e) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which he is established or with those of the country of the contracting authority;
(f) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of taxes in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which he is established or those of the country of the contracting authority;
(g) is guilty of serious misrepresentation in supplying the information required under this Chapter. | | 31992L0050 - Services (2nd generation) | Article 29.1 | CHAPTER 2
Criteria for qualitative selection
Article 29
Any service provider may be excluded from participation in a contract who:
(a) is bankrupt or is being wound up, whose affairs are being administered by the court, who has entered into an arrangement with creditors, who has suspended business activities or who is in any analogous situation arising from a similar procedure under national laws and regulations;
(b) is the subject of proceedings for a declaration of bankruptcy, for an order for compulsory winding-up or administration by the court or for an arrangement with creditors or of any other similar proceedings under national laws or regulations;
(c) has been convicted of an offence concerning his professional conduct by a judgement which has the force of res judicata;
(d) has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by any means which the contracting authorities can justify;
(e) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which he is established or with those of the country of the contracting authority;
(f) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of taxes in accordance with the legal provisions of the country of the contracting authority;
(g) is guilty of serious misrepresentation in supplying or failing to supply the information that may be required under this Chapter.
Where the contracting authority requires of the service provider proof that none of the cases quoted in (a), (b), (c), (e), or (f) applies to him, it shall accept as sufficient evidence:
- for (a), (b) or (c), the production of an extract from the "judicial record" or, failing this, of an equivalent document issued by a competent judicial or administrative authority in the country of origin or in the country whence that person comes showing that these requirements have been met,
- for (e) or (f), a certificate issued by the competent authority in the Member State concerned. | | 31971L0305 - Works (1st generation) | Article 23.1 | Chapter i
Criteria for qualitative selection
Article 23
Any contractor may be excluded from participation in the contract who:
(a) is bankrupt or is being wound up, whose affairs are being administered by the court, who has entered into an arrangement with creditors, who has suspended business activities or who is in any analogous situation arising from a similar procedure under national laws and regulations;
(b) is the subject of proceedings for a declaration of bankruptcy, for an order for compulsory winding up or administration by the court or for an arrangement with creditors or of any other similar proceedings under national laws or regulations;
(c) has been convicted of an offence concerning his professional conduct by a judgment which has the force of res judicata;
(d) who has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by any means which the authorities awarding contracts can justify;
(e) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which he is established or with those of the country of the authority awarding contracts;
(f) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of taxes in accordance with the legal provisions of the country of the authority awarding contracts;
(g) is guilty of serious misrepresentation in supplying the information required under this chapter. | | 31977L0062 - Goods (1st generation) | Article 20.1 | Chapter 1
Criteria for qualitative selection
Article 20
1. Any supplier may be excluded from participation in the contract who:
(a) is bankrupt or is being wound up, whose affairs are being administered by the court, who has entered into an arrangement with creditors, whose business activities have been suspended or who is in any analogous situation arising from a similar procedure under national laws and regulations;
(b) is the subject of proceedings for a declaration of bankruptcy, for an order for compulsory winding up or administration by the court or for an arrangement with creditors or is the subject of any other similar proceedings under national laws or regulations;
(c) has been convicted of an offence concerning his professional conduct by a judgment which has the force of res judicata;
(d) has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by any means which the contracting authorities can prove;
(e) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions in accordance with the statutory provisions of the country in which he is established or those of the country of the contracting authority;
(f) has not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of taxes in accordance with the statutory provisions of the country in which he is established or those of the country of the contracting authority;
(g) is guilty of serious misrepresentation in supplying the information required under this chapter. |
Community procurement - mandatory| 32002R1605 - Community (4th generation) - Commission Q4 | Article 94 | Contracts may not be awarded to candidates or tenderers who, during the procurement procedure:
(a) are subject to a conflict of interest;
(b) are guilty of misrepresentation in supplying the information required by the contracting authority as a condition of participation in the contract procedure or fail to supply this information. | | 32006R1995 - First amendment of Community (4th generation) - Commission Q4A1 | Article 1.53.p1=Q4-94 | 53. Article 94 ..... shall be replaced by the following:
A contract shall not be awarded to candidates or tenderers who, during the procurement procedure for this contract:
(a) are subject to a conflict of interest;
(b) are guilty of misrepresentation in supplying the information required by the contracting authority as a condition of participation in the procurement procedure or fail to supply this information;
(c) find themselves in one of the situations of exclusion, referred to in Article 93(1), for this procurement procedure. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | C-213/07
Michaniki | 37-43 | W2-24.1 | 37 By its first question, the referring court is essentially asking whether the grounds laid down in the first paragraph of Article 24 of Directive 93/37 for excluding participation in a public works contract are exhaustive.
38 The Community directives on public contracts aim to coordinate national procedures in that field (Joined Cases C-226/04 and C-228/04 La Cascina and Others [2006] ECR I-1347, paragraph 20). In the case of public works contracts, the second recital in the preamble to Directive 93/37 explicitly emphasises that objective.
39 It is apparent from the second and tenth recitals in the preamble to Directive 93/37 that that coordination seeks the simultaneous attainment of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of public works contracts and the development, at the Community level, of effective competition in that field, by promoting the widest possible expression of interest among contractors in the Member States (see, to that effect, Case C-225/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-7445, paragraph 34; Case C-399/98 Ordine degli Architetti and Others [2001] ECR I-5409, paragraph 52; Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233, paragraph 34; and Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraph 89).
40 In that context, Article 24 of Directive 93/37, which falls in the title of the directive dealing with the ‘common’ rules on participation, forms part of a detailed set of criteria for the selection of contractors permitted to submit a tender and for the award of the contract (see, by analogy, Case C-94/99 ARGE [2000] ECR I-11037, paragraph 27).
41 In a chapter which deals with the criteria for ‘qualitative’ selection, Article 24 identifies, in its first paragraph, seven grounds for excluding contractors from participation, relating to the professional qualities of the person concerned, more specifically his professional honesty, his solvency and his economic and financial capacity (see, by analogy, Case 76/81 Transporoute et travaux [1982] ECR 417, paragraph 9, and La Cascina and Others, paragraph 21).
42 It should be pointed out in this respect, as the Council of the European Union has done, that the approach of the Community legislature was to adopt only grounds for exclusion based on the objective finding of facts or conduct specific to the contractor concerned, such as to cast discredit on his professional reputation or call into question his economic or financial ability to complete the works covered by the public contract for which he is tendering.
43 Accordingly, the first paragraph of Article 24 of Directive 93/37 must be read as listing exhaustively the grounds capable of justifying the exclusion of a contractor from participation in a contract for reasons, based on objective factors, that relate to his professional qualities. That provision therefore precludes Member States or contracting authorities from adding to the list contained in that provision other grounds for exclusion based on criteria relating to professional qualities (see, by analogy, La Cascina and Others, paragraph 22). | C-213/07
Michaniki | 44-49 | C2A1-3.1.b=W2-6.6
W2-24.1
ECT-Proport | 44 The exhaustive list set out in the first paragraph of Article 24 of Directive 93/37 does not however preclude the option for Member States to maintain or adopt substantive rules designed, in particular, to ensure, in the field of public procurement, observance of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of transparency entailed by the latter, principles which are binding on contracting authorities in any procedure for the award of a public contract (see, to that effect, ARGE, paragraph 24, and Case C-421/01 Traunfellner [2003] ECR I-11941, paragraph 29).
45 Those principles, which mean, in particular, that tenderers must be in a position of equality both when they formulate their tenders and when those tenders are being assessed by the contracting authority (see, to that effect, Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction [2001] ECR I-7725, paragraph 34, and Case C-448/01 EVN and Wienstrom [2003] ECR I-14527, paragraph 47), constitute the basis of the directives on procedures for the award of public contracts (see, inter alia, Universale-Bau and Others, paragraph 91, and Case C-315/01 GAT [2003] ECR I-6351, paragraph 73), and the duty of contracting authorities to ensure that they are observed lies at the very heart of those directives (see, to that effect, Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland [2002] ECR I-7213, paragraph 81, and Joined Cases C-21/03 and C-34/03 Fabricom [2005] ECR I-1559, paragraph 26).
46 Article 6(6) of Directive 93/37 states moreover that contracting authorities are to ensure that there is no discrimination between the various contractors.
47 It follows that, in addition to the grounds for exclusion based on objective considerations of professional quality, which are listed exhaustively in the first paragraph of Article 24 of Directive 93/37, a Member State is entitled to provide for exclusionary measures designed to ensure observance, in procedures for the award of public contracts, of the principles of equal treatment of all tenderers and of transparency.
48 However, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, which constitutes a general principle of Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paragraph 47), such measures must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective (see, to that effect, Fabricom, paragraph 34).
49 In view of the foregoing, the answer to the first question must be that the first paragraph of Article 24 of Directive 93/37 must be interpreted as listing exhaustively the grounds based on objective considerations of professional quality which are capable of justifying the exclusion of a contractor from participation in a public works contract. However, that directive does not preclude a Member State from providing for further exclusionary measures designed to ensure observance of the principles of equal treatment of tenderers and of transparency, provided that such measures do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective. | T-333/07
Entrance Services | 59-77 | Q4-93.1.c
Q4-94 | 59 En ce qui concerne le second grief, tiré de la violation de l’article 93, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement financier, il convient de rappeler qu’il résulte des dispositions des articles 93 et 94 du règlement financier et de l’article 133 des modalités d’application que le pouvoir adjudicateur, s’il constate, par tout moyen qu’il peut justifier, l’existence d’une faute grave en matière professionnelle commise par un soumissionnaire, doit exclure ce dernier de la procédure de passation de marché. Il en découle une obligation, pour le pouvoir adjudicateur, dès lors que celui-ci est informé, au cours de la procédure, d’une prétendue faute grave en matière professionnelle commise par un soumissionnaire, de vérifier cette information et, si cette faute grave est établie à suffisance de droit, d’exclure le soumissionnaire en question de la procédure. À défaut de précisions à cet égard dans les réglementations pertinentes, il y a lieu de constater que le pouvoir adjudicateur dispose d’une certaine marge d’appréciation en ce qui concerne l’appréciation de la gravité de la faute pouvant être retenue contre le soumissionnaire.
60 En l’espèce, la requérante a informé le Parlement, par lettre du 14 mai 2007, que Kone avait fait l’objet d’une décision par laquelle la Commission sanctionnait une violation par cette entreprise des règles de concurrence.
61 Il incombait dès lors au Parlement, d’une part, d’examiner si les faits repris dans la décision de la Commission pouvaient permettre d’établir l’existence d’une faute grave en matière professionnelle, ce qu’il pouvait constater par tout moyen qu’il pouvait justifier, et, d’autre part, dans l’affirmative, d’exclure Kone de la procédure.
62 La décision de la Commission sanctionnait Kone du fait d’avoir, notamment, truqué des appels d’offres dans le cadre de marchés publics et le Parlement a admis, lors de l’audience en réponse à une question posée par le Tribunal, que ce type d’acte pouvait constituer une faute grave au sens de l’article 93, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement financier. La Commission elle-même, dans la décision du 21 février 2007, qualifie la violation des règles de concurrence commise par les différentes entreprises membres du cartel de « très grave » (points 657 et suivants de la décision de la Commission). 63 Or, c’est notamment en vue de sanctionner ce type de comportement que l’article 93, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement financier impose au pouvoir adjudicateur d’exclure la participation de telles entreprises à des marchés publics communautaires.
64 Il ressort par ailleurs de la déclaration de la Commission datée du 21 février 2007, transmise au Parlement par la requérante, que cette entente portait non seulement sur des contrats d’installation mais aussi d’entretien. À cet égard, la Commission a constaté notamment qu’« [e]ntre au moins 1995 et 2004, ces sociétés ont truqué des appels d’offres, fixé les prix, se sont attribuées des projets, se sont réparties les marchés et ont échangé des informations commercialement importantes et confidentielles » et que « [c]ette entente pourrait produire des effets pendant vingt à cinquante ans, car l’entretien est souvent assuré par les sociétés qui ont initialement installé l’équipement ». Or, cette affirmation, qui a été présentée par la requérante à l’audience, n’a pas été mise en doute par le Parlement.
65 Il convient, dès lors, d’examiner les arguments avancés par le Parlement afin de justifier l’absence de constatation d’une faute grave en matière professionnelle commise par Kone.
66 Il y a lieu d’observer, tout d’abord, que c’est à juste titre que le Parlement avance qu’il lui appartenait de vérifier si le soumissionnaire était enregistré dans la base de données de la Commission.
67 Toutefois, le pouvoir adjudicateur ne pouvait s’arrêter à l’absence d’inscription du soumissionnaire dans ladite base dès lors que, conformément à l’article 93, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement financier, il pouvait constater par tout moyen l’existence d’une faute grave commise par le soumissionnaire et, le cas échéant, exclure ledit soumissionnaire, conformément à l’article 94 du règlement financier.
68 Il résulte, en effet, des dispositions des articles 93 à 95 du règlement financier que, contrairement à la thèse soutenue par le Parlement, la seule absence d’enregistrement dans la base de données ne saurait créer une présomption irréfragable que le soumissionnaire n’a pas commis de faute grave en matière professionnelle.
69 Par ailleurs, le Parlement, après avoir été informé par lettre de la requérante de faits susceptibles de constituer une faute grave entraînant l’exclusion du soumissionnaire, ne pouvait d’autant moins s’arrêter – après avoir consulté, sans résultat, la base de données de la Commission – à la seule déclaration sur l’honneur communiquée par Kone en vertu de l’article 93, paragraphe 2, du règlement financier.
70 Or, l’analyse des offres, datée du 31 mai 2007, qui a été communiquée par le Parlement en annexe au mémoire en défense, laisse apparaître que le Parlement s’est référé uniquement à la déclaration sur l’honneur transmise par Kone et paraît n’avoir réservé aucune autre suite à la lettre de la requérante l’informant de la décision de la Commission concernant l’infraction aux règles de concurrence, après avoir interrogé la base de données de la Commission. La fiche du procès-verbal d’évaluation relative à Kone mentionne en effet « OK, rien à signaler » sous la rubrique « Recevabilité des offres […] iii) en matière professionnelle, ont commis une faute grave ».
71 Interrogé à cet égard lors de l’audience, le Parlement n’a pas été en mesure de préciser les démarches entreprises par ses services, autres que la consultation de la base de données de la Commission.
72 Or, il ressort par ailleurs d’une pièce déposée par le Parlement lors de l’audience et datée du 31 mai 2007, que le service financier central du Parlement a été interrogé par un membre du comité d’évaluation, afin de savoir si, à la suite de la décision prise par la Commission, Kone avait été inscrite sur la liste des sociétés à exclure ou si, au contraire, le marché pouvait être attribué à Kone. À cette question, le service financier central du Parlement a répondu que Kone n’était pas reprise sur la liste de sociétés à exclure. Par ailleurs, ce service a précisé ce qui suit : « [N]ous vous rappelons que les sanctions imposées par la Commission dans le cadre de la politique pour la concurrence ne rentrent pas parmi les critères d’exclusion prévus aux articles 93 et 94 [du règlement financier], ni parmi les causes de sanction prévues à l’article 96 [, paragraphe 1, de ce même règlement] pourvu que ces sanctions en matière de concurrence ne constituent pas des faits pouvant rentrer en même temps parmi ‘les fautes professionnelles graves’ prévues à l’article 93 [, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement financier]. »
73 Il apparaît ainsi que la question de la régularité de l’attribution du marché public à Kone a été soulevée au sein même du Parlement et que, même si le service financier central du Parlement s’est retranché derrière les données reprises dans la base de données et a donné une réponse quelque peu équivoque à la question qui lui était posée, il n’en reste pas moins que le comité d’évaluation s’est abstenu de donner une suite réelle au problème qui avait été soulevé en temps utile tant par la requérante que par le service financier central du Parlement.
74 Ainsi, le Parlement a commis une erreur de droit en omettant d’apprécier si le contenu de la décision de la Commission devait entraîner l’exclusion de Kone de la procédure.
75 En outre, l’on ne saurait confondre la faute et la sanction de celle-ci. La décision de la Commission de réduire l’amende pour des motifs tenant à la coopération de l’entreprise dans le cadre de l’enquête relève en effet de l’appréciation de la sanction et non de l’appréciation de la faute commise et n’influe pas sur la gravité de celle-ci.
76 Partant, l’argumentation avancée à cet égard par le Parlement ne saurait prospérer.
77 En conclusion, dans ces circonstances, il y a lieu de considérer que le Parlement ne pouvait s’arrêter à la seule consultation de la base de données et à la déclaration sur l’honneur produite par Kone afin d’examiner si les faits portés à sa connaissance par la requérante constituaient une faute grave en matière professionnelle au sens du règlement financier. Partant, il a violé l’article 93, paragraphe 1, sous c), et l’article 94 du règlement financier et la décision attaquée doit être annulée. | C-189/06-PA
TEA-CEGOS | 27-32 | Q4-94.1.a-impl
ECT-LegCert | 27 La Commission fait valoir, à titre subsidiaire, que la présente branche du moyen est non fondée.
28 Il convient de considérer que l’exclusion automatique des soumissionnaires appartenant au même groupement juridique, prévue au point 13 de l’avis de marché, visait à éviter que la concurrence soit faussée et à concrétiser la notion de situation de conflit d’intérêts au sens de l’article 94 du règlement financier.
29 Dans le cadre d’un appel d’offres, la simple mention des termes «groupement juridique» présente un degré de précision suffisante, sans que la Commission soit tenue d’apporter plus d’informations.
30 En effet, si un pouvoir adjudicateur est tenu de rédiger les conditions d’un appel d’offres avec précision et clarté, il n’est pas obligé de prévoir à l’avance tous les cas de figure, aussi rares qu’ils puissent être, susceptibles de se présenter dans la pratique.
31 Il est loisible audit pouvoir d’évaluer l’applicabilité d’une condition telle que celle posée au point 13 de l’avis de marché en procédant à un examen au cas par cas en tenant compte de tous les éléments pertinents, ainsi que le Tribunal l’a jugé au point 52 de l’arrêt attaqué.
32 Il s’ensuit que le Tribunal n’a pas méconnu le principe de sécurité juridique et que la première branche du moyen n’est pas fondée. | C-189/06-PA
TEA-CEGOS | 51-54 | Q4-94.1.a-impl
ECT-LegCert | 51 Par la deuxième branche de ce moyen, les requérantes font valoir que le Tribunal a dénaturé la décision de la Commission du 12 octobre 2005 adressée à TEA-CEGOS Consortium. D’une part, elles reprochent au Tribunal d’avoir considéré, au point 58 de l’arrêt attaqué, que l’appartenance structurelle constituait un indice du «risque de concurrence faussée entre les soumissionnaires, voire de conflit d’intérêts» alors que le critère figurant dans le règlement financier est celui de «la situation de conflit d’intérêts» (par opposition au simple risque d’une telle situation). D’autre part, les requérantes font valoir que le Tribunal a dénaturé ladite décision en retenant que la Commission s’était fondée principalement sur un critère structurel alors que, en fait, cette institution s’était fondée exclusivement sur le critère structurel.
52 S’agissant du premier de ces arguments, il convient de considérer que, dans le présent contexte, les notions de situation de conflit d’intérêts et de risque de conflit d’intérêts, contrairement à ce que laissent entendre les requérantes, ne s’excluent pas mutuellement. En effet, les deux notions sont intimement liées à la prévention du risque que le pouvoir adjudicateur prenne des décisions faussées. Par conséquent, le Tribunal, en se fondant sur le critère du risque de conflit d’intérêts, n’a pas dénaturé la décision litigieuse.
53 Quant au second argument, il ressort du dossier que la Commission a demandé, dans un premier temps, des informations se rattachant au critère fonctionnel pour ensuite retenir le critère structurel comme base de sa décision du 12 octobre 2005. Lorsque le Tribunal a considéré, à la première phrase du point 62 de l’arrêt attaqué, que la Commission s’était fondée principalement sur un critère structurel, c’est manifestement en se référant à l’ensemble de ce processus décisionnel et non pas exclusivement aux termes de la décision du 12 octobre 2005. Lue en ce sens, la constatation du Tribunal selon laquelle la Commission s’était fondée principalement sur un critère structurel n’est pas inexacte. Il en résulte que le présent argument est fondé sur une lecture erronée de l’arrêt attaqué.
54 Par conséquent, il convient de considérer la deuxième branche du présent moyen comme non fondée. | C-189/06-PA
TEA-CEGOS | 55-59 | Q4-94.1.a-impl | 55 Par la troisième branche de ce moyen, les requérantes font valoir que le DIIS et le DIHR sont des entités autonomes qui ne disposent l’une à l’égard de l’autre d’aucun moyen de contrôle et qui ne sont soumises à aucun contrôle de la part du Centre. En concluant qu’il n’en est pas ainsi, le Tribunal aurait dénaturé certains éléments de preuve. D’une part, elles font valoir que le Tribunal n’identifie pas les pièces du dossier sur lesquelles il se fonde pour conclure, au point 57 de l’arrêt attaqué, qu’un échange de vues concernant les stratégies commerciales à conduire peut avoir lieu au niveau du conseil d’administration du Centre et que les éléments du dossier ne permettent pas d’arriver à cette conclusion. D’autre part, les requérantes prétendent que le Tribunal a dénaturé les éléments de preuve en retenant, au point 59 de cet arrêt, que l’autonomie financière des instituts est relativement limitée par l’influence du Centre.
56 S’agissant de l’argument relatif à la possibilité d’un échange de vues au sein du conseil d’administration du Centre, il convient de constater, d’une part, qu’il ressort clairement du point 57 de l’arrêt attaqué que le Tribunal se réfère pour l’essentiel à la loi danoise du 6 juin 2002. Il résulte, d’autre part, de ce point que le Tribunal n’a pas affirmé qu’un tel échange de vues avait effectivement eu lieu. Il a simplement considéré, et cela constitue une évidence, que la présence des membres des instituts au sein du conseil d’administration du Centre permettait un tel échange. Il s’ensuit que cet argument n’est pas fondé.
57 En ce qui concerne l’argument relatif à l’autonomie financière des instituts en cause, il convient de relever, d’une part, que le Tribunal a retenu de façon exacte que ces derniers sont financés par des fonds publics, lesquels leur sont attribués selon une formule sur laquelle le Centre n’a aucune emprise. D’autre part, s’agissant de la question du contrôle des comptes de ces instituts, le Tribunal s’est fondé sur des éléments contenus dans le dossier. Il en découle que le Tribunal n’a pas dénaturé les éléments de preuve relatifs à ce point.
58 Par conséquent, la troisième branche du moyen n’est pas fondée.
59 Il résulte de ce qui précède que le deuxième moyen doit être rejeté | T-376/05
TEA-CEGOS | 51-62 | Q4-94.1.a-impl | 51. The Court observes that Article 13 of the procurement notice prohibited entities within the same legal group from participating in the same call for tenders, for example as members of consortia, in order to prevent the risk of a conflict of interest or of distorted competition between the tenderers. As a result of that prohibition, the validity of a tender was dependent on compliance with Article 13 of the procurement notice, since the Commission has a broad discretion in determining both the content and the application of the rules applicable to the award of a contract following a call for tenders. Therefore, the article applies even where an infringement of the article is detected only at an advanced stage of the tendering procedure.
52. In the light of the foregoing, it must be determined in the present case whether the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment in taking the view that the DIIS and the DIHR belonged to the same legal group. To that end, it should be noted that in the absence of a definition of the concept of legal group in legislation or in case-law, laying down the criteria applying to such a group, the Commission was required to conduct an examination of each individual case, taking into account all the relevant factors, in order to decide whether the conditions for the application of Article 13 of the procurement notice had been met.
53. Consequently, in order to recognise the existence of a legal group in the present case, the Commission had to determine whether the entities in question were structurally linked to the Centre, since this factor was liable to give rise to a risk of a conflict of interest or of distorted competition between the tenderers, although other factors could support the examination of structural links, such as those relating to the degree of independence of the entities in question which are described by the parties as functional criteria'.
54. In the present case, it can be seen from the contested decisions that the Commission found that the DIIS and the DIHR legally formed part of the Centre and therefore belonged to the same structure. It inferred from the Danish law of 6 June 2002 and from the statutes of the Centre and those of the institutes that the DIIS and the DIHR did not constitute legal entities distinct from the Centre and noted that the Centre was among other things responsible for the common administration of the two institutes, which were, moreover, represented on the Centre's board of management.
55. First, as regards the question whether institutes belong to the Centre structurally, it is apparent from the documents before the Court, and more specifically Paragraph 1(2) of the Danish Law of 6 June 2002, that the Centre is composed of two autonomous entities, the DIIS and the DIHR, and that the two institutes and the Centre share the same premises.
56. As regards the administration of the two institutes, as the Commission observed in the contested decisions, Article 2 of the Centre's statutes provides that the Centre shall provide joint administration concerning finance, staff administration, management, joint services and the joint library'. Thus, administrative services, such as payment of salaries and management of invoices, are provided by the Centre, which receives specific remuneration from the two institutes for the services provided, and the Centre is also responsible for receiving payments made to the institutes.
57. Furthermore, as the Commission also pointed out in the contested decisions, there is a link between the institutes and the Centre's board of management, since certain board members are appointed by the DIIS and the DIHR (Paragraph 5(3) of the Danish Law of 6 June 2002). An exchange of views on the commercial strategies to be pursued by the two institutes may therefore take place at this high level of the structure. This link is reinforced by the fact, also apparent from the papers before the Court, that the Centre's board of management discusses operational forecasts for the two institutes.
58. In the light of the foregoing, the two institutes must be regarded as structurally forming part of the same legal group. Consequently, the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in applying Article 13 of the procurement notice, since the fact that the institutes belonged to the Centre structurally was sufficient evidence of a risk of distorted competition between the tenderers, or even a conflict of interest. It must also be stated that consideration of factors relating to the functional criterion does not call into question the Commission's assessment in this regard.
59. Second, as regards the functional criterion, namely the institutes' independence from the Centre, the Court notes that the institutes' financial autonomy is relatively limited by the influence of the Centre. As is apparent from the papers before the Court, the DIIS and the DIHR are financed in part by public funds granted to the Centre, which must divide them on the basis of an 80% share for the DIIS and 20% for the DIHR. In addition, Articles 4 and 15 of the DIIS's statutes provide that the DIIS is under the auspices of the [Centre]' and that the accounts of the institute, as an entity of the [Centre], shall be audited by the Rigsrevisor'. Similarly, the DIHR's accounts must be approved by the Centre's board of management.
60. As regards the institutes' decision-making autonomy, the applicants highlight the fact that the institutes' boards of management are autonomous from the Centre. However, this claim is not sufficient to rebut the finding that the DIIS and the DIHR belong to the same legal group, since such a situation does not necessarily preclude decision-making autonomy for different legal entities coexisting within the same group.
61. As regards the applicants' argument that the Commission failed to take into consideration the fact that the institutes had distinct assets, the Court notes that the applicants have not been able to provide conclusive evidence to show that in the contested decisions the Commission wrongly took the view that the institutes' assets belonged to the Centre. Furthermore, the fact that the Commission did not consider the institutes to have legal personality does not constitute a manifest error of assessment resulting in a misapplication of Article 13 of the procurement notice. First, it should be noted that the contested decisions are not in any way based on the absence of legal personality, since no mention is made of that factor in the decisions. Second, as the Commission proves satisfactorily in its written submissions, even if the institutes had their own legal personality, the fact that the DIIS and the DIHR belonged to the Centre justified the application of Article 13 of the procurement notice.
62. Consequently, the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in basing its position principally on a structural criterion. The fact that it was able initially to request information relating to the functional criterion and then used the structural criterion cannot affect this finding, since the Commission undertook a thorough examination of the facts of the case before applying Article 13 of the procurement notice. | T-376/05
TEA-CEGOS | 71-73 | Q4-94.1.a-impl | 71. It should be noted that the decisions of 20 May 2005 expressly stated that the signing of the framework contract was subject to evidence being provided by the applicants that they were not in any of the situations corresponding to the grounds for exclusion set out in point 2.3.3 of the Practical Guide. In addition, it is apparent from the actual wording of Article 14 of the instructions to tenderers that it was for the successful candidates to prove the truth of their statements. Consequently, the award of the contract was dependent on the submission of evidence capable of proving the veracity of the information supplied by the applicants when they submitted their tenders and on the Commission verifying that Article 13 of the procurement notice had been complied with.
72. As has already been pointed out (paragraph 51 above), the validity of any tender was dependent on compliance with Article 13 and the Commission could apply that article at an advanced stage of the procedure, at the very least until the evidence mentioned in the preceding paragraph had been examined. Consequently, the applicants' argument that Article 13 of the procurement notice could not apply once an award decision had been taken is unfounded.
73. The first plea must therefore be rejected. | T-195/05
Deloitte | 64-81 | Q4-94 | 64. The reasons for the decision rejecting Euphet's tender were the risk of conflict of interest on the part of the tenderer, the tenderer's failure to acknowledge the existence of such a risk and the absence, in the tender, of concrete proposals for the removal of that risk. Thus, firstly, it must be determined, on the one hand, whether the Commission was correct to base its refusal of the tender submitted by Euphet on the existence of a risk of conflict of interest and, on the other, whether it was indeed the existence of that risk which led the Commission to adopt the decision rejecting the tender. Subsequently, it must be considered whether the Commission was justified in taking the view that the risk of conflict of interest alleged actually existed in the present case.
65. The legal basis for the decision rejecting the tender is to be found in Article 94 of the Financial Regulation, reproduced in section 9.1.3 of the specifications, which provides for the exclusion - from the award of contracts - of tenderers who during the award procedure' are subject to a conflict of interest'. Moreover, the decision rejecting the tender suggests as a definition of conflict of interest the terms of Article II.3.1 of the framework contract, which provides: The Contractor shall take all necessary measures to prevent any situation that could compromise the impartial and objective performance of the Contract. Such conflict of interest could arise in particular as a result of economic interest, political or national affinity, family or emotional ties, or any other relevant connection or shared interest'. Article II.3.1 also provides that the Contractor shall ensure that his staff, board and directors are not placed in a situation which could give rise to conflict of interests'.
66. Article 94 of the Financial Regulation applies - according to the provisions of that regulation - to all public contracts financed in whole or in part by the Community budget. Thus no distinction is made according to whether the procurement procedure in question relates to a framework contract or another type of contract.
67. However, Article 94 of the Financial Regulation permits exclusion of a tenderer from a procurement procedure only if the situation of conflict of interest to which it refers is real and not hypothetical. That does not mean that a risk of conflict of interest is not sufficient to exclude a tender. In principle, it is only when the contract is performed that a conflict of interest can become real. Before conclusion of the contract, a conflict of interest can be only potential and Article 94 of the Financial Regulation therefore implies an assessment in terms of risk. That risk must actually be found to exist, following a specific assessment of the tender and the tenderer's situation, for that tenderer to be excluded from the procedure. The mere possibility of a conflict of interest cannot suffice for that purpose.
68. It follows that, in the procedure for the award of a framework contract, account must be taken of the fact that specific contracts, award of which will give rise to a check that there is no risk of conflict of interest, must come into being before the successful tenderer for the framework contract is entrusted with the performance of specific tasks. Thus, in such a case, the risk that a conflict of interest will in fact arise can be considered only where there are material circumstances placing the tenderer in a position where it is unable to avoid the risk of bias in the performance of the majority of the tasks under the framework contract.
69. In the present case, the decision rejecting the tender could rightly be related to a situation of conflict of interest that was real and not hypothetical and it is that situation which led the Commission to adopt that decision.
70. As stated in paragraph 16 above, the decision rejecting the tender shows that the main partners in Euphet are involved in activities of the DG Health and Consumer Protection', particularly since they hold a large number of subsidy contracts in that area and that of public health, whereas Euphet does not acknowledge that its members are involved in the implementation of the public health programme.
71. The Commission has also stated, without being contradicted on the point, that the majority of the most experienced experts proposed by Euphet are connected with organisations which have received large subsidies from the Commission for carrying out work relating to the Community public health programme.
72. By concluding, on that basis, in the decision rejecting the tender and in the confirmatory letter of 19 May 2005, that there was a risk of conflict of interest, classified as great', the Commission thus took the view that a situation of conflict of interest already existed in principle at the stage of the procedure for the award of the contract, even if that conflict had not yet materialised in terms of its consequences.
73. It follows that the Commission correctly assessed Euphet's tender on the basis of the provisions of Article 94 of the Financial Regulation and of section 9.1.3 of the specifications. Accordingly, the applicant's argument that criteria extraneous to those provisions were taken into account in rejecting its tender cannot be accepted.
74. The applicant's arguments to the contrary are not such as to cast doubt on that conclusion.
75. The argument that Article II.3.1 of the framework contract applies only to conflicts of interest arising during performance of the framework contract and not to those at the stage of the procurement procedure is irrelevant, since the conflict of interest in the present case existed at the stage of award of the contract, thus justifying the exclusion of the tender pursuant to Article 94 of the Financial Regulation and section 9.1.3 of the specifications. For the same reason, the applicant submits in vain that the proposed course of action for resolving conflicts of interest exceeded the requirements of the framework contract in so far as it entailed an ex-ante check, that is to say, with effect from the stage of drawing up of the application file, with reference to the nature and the subject of the specific contracts.
76. In the same way, contrary to the applicant's assertion, since the subject-matter of the framework contract was expressly defined, the Commission was entitled to find that, because of the subsidies received, serious doubts could be cast on the objectivity of the main partners in Euphet as early as the time when the tender was lodged, the reason being, as stated in the decision rejecting the tender, that that situation could require the evaluator to assess his own work, thus creating a conflict of interest.
77. Next, with regard to whether the Commission was in fact justified in finding that there was a situation of conflict of interest in the present case involving Euphet and in taking the view that Euphet did not recognise such a risk, it must be noted that, as stated in paragraph 70 above, the Commission states in the decision rejecting the tender - without being contradicted by the applicant on that point - that the evaluation committee found that the main partners in Euphet have a number, indeed a large number, of subsidy contracts with DG Health and Consumer Protection', particularly in the area of public health. Having regard to the subject-matter of the framework contract, namely evaluation... covering the policy areas of DG Health and Consumer Protection... (public health)', the Commission was correct to take the view, at the stage of the procedure to award the contract, that there was a conflict of interest which could compromise the impartial and objective performance of the framework contract by Euphet. Furthermore, the Commission points out in the decision rejecting the tender that Euphet's tender specified that Euphet understands and accepts that none of the evaluation organisations or their staff should have the slightest existing or potential conflict of interest in the performance of their task under the framework contract. We confirm that all the participants in Euphet are entirely independent of the Commission and that we do not foresee any risk in this regard at present'. Accordingly, it must be held that the Commission was also correct to infer from that in the decision rejecting the tender that Euphet [did] not acknowledge the fact that a number of the consortium partners [had] a large involvement in the implementation of the Public Health programme' and that, considering the great risk of [conflict of interest], a detailed and concrete explanation would have been required to provide a sufficient level of understanding of how the [conflict of interest] issue should be addressed and the risks should be eliminated'.
78. It follows from the foregoing that the Commission was right to take the view that, pursuant to Article 94 of the Financial Regulation and section 9.1.3 of the specifications, it was necessary to exclude Euphet's tender from the award of the contract.
79. The applicant's argument that it is unlawful to exclude a tenderer in an abstract manner without any specific check of its tender, and in particular of its proposal for resolving conflicts of interest, is unfounded.
80. It follows from the foregoing findings that in the present case the Commission did carry out a specific check on the tender submitted by Euphet before deciding to exclude it from the contract. Moreover, the alleged lack of examination of the proposal for resolving conflicts of interest is irrelevant, since the Commission was required to reject Euphet's tender, because of the conflict of interest, pursuant to Article 94 of the Financial Regulation and section 9.1.3 of the specifications.
81. In the light of the foregoing, the applicant's argument relating to the lack of conflict of interest cannot be accepted and the second part of the first plea must be rejected. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 83-88 | Q4-94 | 83. In its first plea, the applicant claims essentially that Euphet's exclusion from the tendering procedure by the Commission infringes Article 94 of the Financial Regulation, the provisions of the tender documents, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, the general obligation to state reasons and Articles 147(3) and 138 of the detailed implementing rules.
84. First of all, it is appropriate to examine the applicant's arguments according to which the Commission infringed Article 94 of the Financial Regulation and the provisions of the tender documents.
85. In this respect, it should be noted that the Commission justified the decision rejecting the tender by the existence of a major risk' of a conflict of interest which, in its view, could not be resolved satisfactorily by the guarantees offered by Euphet.
86. As the applicant stresses, Article II.3.1 of the draft framework contract, which was annexed to the specifications, provides for a mechanism for resolving conflicts of interest to which the successful tenderer might be subject. However, on the one hand, it cannot be ruled out, prima facie, that that provision might govern conflicts of interest arising during the performance of the framework contract and not from the stage of the tendering procedure. On the other hand, prima facie, that provision cannot in any event preclude the application of Article 94 of the Financial Regulation.
87. Article 94 of the Financial Regulation provides for the exclusion of tenderers who during the procurement procedure' are subject to a conflict of interest'. In this regard, the President considers that it cannot be ruled out, prima facie, that the expression subject to a conflict of interest' includes the risks of conflicts of interest present from the stage of the procurement procedure which may affect the performance of the contract.
88. In such a situation, the question nevertheless arises as to the degree of certainty needed to justify exclusion from the tendering procedure and the discretion enjoyed by the Commission in establishing a risk of a conflict of interest. The President considers that it is for the Court of First Instance to answer these questions and that the applicant's arguments cannot therefore, at this stage, be rejected as unfounded. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 89-91 | Q4-94 | 89. Nevertheless, at this stage, and in the light of the arguments put forward in the interlocutory proceedings, doubts must be raised as to whether the Commission committed an error in establishing a risk of a conflict of interest in respect of an institution which receives Community grants in the field of public health and is subsequently required to participate in the evaluation of Community policy in that field. It is clear, prima facie, that such an institution is placed in a position that is at least capable of affecting its objectivity.
90. In the present case, it can be seen from Sections 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 of the tender specifications that the framework contract relates inter alia to certain evaluations of the programme of Community action in the field of public health. In addition, the decision rejecting the tender states that, in the opinion of the Commission, the grants received by certain of Euphet's members give rise to a major risk of a conflict of interest.
91. In the light of the foregoing, and at this stage, doubts must therefore be raised as to whether the Commission committed an error of assessment in considering that, for certain members of Euphet, receipt of grants in the field of public health gave rise to a major risk of a conflict of interest justifying exclusion from the tendering procedure. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 92-93 | Q4-94 | 92. Furthermore, in the light of the arguments made in the interlocutory proceedings, it is not apparent that the Commission refrained from conducting a specific examination of the risk of a conflict of interest established vis-à-vis Euphet, in particular because it did not know the precise nature of the specific contracts to be concluded. First of all, the decision rejecting the tender makes reference to the programme of Community action in the field of public health, the evaluation of which is precisely one of the subjects of the framework contract. However, it is not apparent at this stage that the Commission failed to conduct a specific examination of the risk of a conflict of interest identified by it having regard to the subject of the contract. Secondly, because of the grants received by certain members of Euphet, serious doubts could be cast, prima facie, on their objectivity. Consequently, at this stage, doubts must be raised as to the need to know the detailed content of the specific contracts to be concluded in order to establish the existence of a major risk of a conflict of interest.
93. The President nevertheless considers that this question must be examined in detail in the main proceedings. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 94-99 | Q3-53-impl
Q4-94 | 94. Similarly, there are, prima facie, reasons to doubt whether the applicant may rely effectively on the judgments in Fabricom , cited in paragraph 35 above, and AFCon Management Consultants and Others v Commission , cited in paragraph 35 above.
95. First of all, in Fabricom , cited in paragraph 35 above, the Court held essentially that the Community directives relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public contracts preclude a rule which states that any person who has been instructed to carry out research, experiments, studies or development in connection with a public contract for works, supplies or services is not permitted to apply to participate in or to submit a tender for a public contract for those works, supplies or services where that person has not been given an opportunity to prove that, in the circumstances of the case, the experience which he has acquired was not capable of distorting competition.
96. However, at this stage, it has not been clearly shown that the applicant has not been able to prove, in connection with its tender, that the grants received by some of the experts which Euphet intends to use were irrelevant.
97. Secondly, with regard to the applicant's reference to the judgment in AFCon Management Consultants and Others v Commission , cited in paragraph 35 above, it should be noted that, in that judgment, the Court of First Instance held essentially that after the discovery of a conflict of interest between a tenderer and a member of the evaluation committee, the Commission must act with due diligence and on the basis of all the relevant information when adopting its decision on the outcome of the procedure and that the Commission has some discretion to determine the measures which must be taken (paragraphs 75 and 77). In the light of the circumstances of that case, the Court found that the Commission had made an error of assessment in failing to investigate the relations between a tenderer and a member of the evaluation committee.
98. However, at this stage, doubts must be raised as to whether it is possible usefully to compare the facts of the present case with those that gave rise to the judgment in AFCon Management Consultants and Others v Commission , cited in paragraph 35 above. In the present case, unlike the facts which gave rise to that judgment, there is no reason to think, prima facie, that Euphet's exclusion caused unequal treatment. All the tenderers were, prima facie, in the same position as regards providing proof in their respective tenders that there was no conflict of interest.
99. The President nevertheless considers that this question must be examined in detail in the main proceedings. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 100-103 | Q4-94 | 100. Lastly, also in the light of the arguments made in the application for interim measures, doubts must be raised as to whether the tender submitted by Euphet allowed any risk of a conflict of interest to be eliminated.
101. First of all, it does not appear at this stage that the Commission manifestly committed an error in considering that the guarantees offered by Euphet were inadequate. As the Commission points out, the proposal for a corrective measure was formulated in general terms and made no specific reference to the risk of a conflict of interest identified by the Commission. Furthermore, in the interlocutory proceedings, the applicant does not cite any passages of its tender where it states that it was aware and took into consideration the specific risk identified by the Commission in the decision rejecting the tender. Quite the opposite, Euphet states in its tender that all the participants in Euphet are entirely independent of the Commission' and that it does not foresee any risk in this regard at present'.
102. Second, it is true, as the applicant notes, that not all the experts proposed in its tender come from institutions subject to the risk of a conflict of interest identified by the Commission. At this stage, however, it is not apparent that the Commission was required to regard that element as sufficient grounds to rule out any risk of a conflict of interest, in particular in the light of the links and respective roles of the members of Euphet. In this respect, as the Commission points out, it can be seen inter alia from Euphet's tender that each of its members is represented on a contract committee' which is responsible for managing and supervising Euphet's evaluation services.
103. For similar substantive reasons, doubts must also be raised as to whether the Commission must consider that the members of an institution subject to a conflict of interest are not themselves personally subject to that conflict. There is every reason to assume that there is a community of professional interests between an expert and the institution employing him. However, at this stage, the applicant does not provide evidence or arguments to reverse this presumption. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 104-105 | Q4-89.1
Q4-94
Q4-99 | 104. Third, doubts must also be raised as to whether the rejection of the applicant's tender constitutes a breach of the principle of equality as set out in Articles 89(1) and 99 of the Financial Regulation, because a tenderer subject to a conflict of interest during the performance of the framework contract would be allowed to perform the contract provided it takes adequate measures. As has already been observed (paragraphs 100 to 103), it is not apparent, at this stage, that the Commission committed an error in considering that Euphet's tender was not adequate, from the stage of the tendering procedure, for preventing a risk of a conflict of interest. Prima facie, the applicant cannot therefore claim that it is in a comparable situation to a tenderer subject to a conflict of interest arising only during the performance of the framework contract.
105. Consequently, whilst the applicant's arguments require several assessments to be made in the main proceedings and cannot therefore be regarded, at this stage, as unfounded, doubts must nevertheless be raised as to whether the Commission infringed Article 94 of the Financial Regulation or the provisions of the tender documents. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 114-117 | Q4-89.1-impl
Q4-94impl | 114. Secondly, at this stage, doubts must also be raised as to whether the applicant may rely effectively on the judgment in Fabricom , cited in paragraph 35 above, in order to show that the Commission could not conduct a specific assessment of the potential conflict of interest without requesting additional information from it.
115. First of all, the applicant does not clearly show, at this stage, that the Commission could not conduct a specific examination of the risk of a conflict of interest established vis-à-vis Euphet without knowing the precise nature of the specific contracts to be concluded. As has already been observed in the examination of the first plea (paragraph 92 above), it is not apparent at this stage that the Commission failed to conduct a specific examination of a risk of a conflict of interest having regard to the subject of the framework contract. It is not apparent either, at this stage, that that examination was insufficient to establish the existence of a major risk of a conflict of interest and that it was also necessary to know the precise nature of the specific contracts to be concluded.
116. Second, prima facie, the fact that, in the Commission's view, the terms of the corrective measure proposed by Euphet were too general does not mean that it could not conduct a specific examination of Euphet's situation with regard to conflicts of interest. The general nature of the terms of the tender submitted by Euphet is precisely one of the criteria assessed by the Commission in the decision rejecting the tender in order to reach the conclusion that the Euphet's proposed corrective measure, as set out in its tender, is not adequate for resolving the risk of a conflict of interest identified by the Commission.
117. The President nevertheless considers that this question must be examined in detail in the main proceedings. | C-226/04 & C-228/04
Cascina | 19-28 | S2-29.1.e+f | 19. By its questions, the national court wishes in substance to know, firstly, whether subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 must be interpreted as precluding a national provision which refers to the position of service providers who are not in compliance' with social security or tax obligations. Secondly, it wishes to know the time at which the service provider must provide evidence that he has complied with those obligations. Thirdly, it is unsure whether a service provider who is late with payment of its social security contributions or taxes, has been authorised by the competent authorities to make payment of those contributions or taxes in instalments, or has brought administrative or judicial proceedings to contest the existence or amount of its social security or tax obligations must be regarded as not having fulfilled his social security or tax obligations for the purposes of subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive.
20. In order to provide a useful reply to those questions, it must be observed as a preliminary point that the Community directives on public contracts aim to coordinate national procedures in that field. As regards, more particularly, public service contracts, the third recital in the preamble to the Directive states that the objectives set out in the first and second recitals... require the coordination of the procurement procedures for the award of public service contracts'.
21. As regards that coordination, Article 29 of the Directive lays down seven grounds for excluding candidates from participation in a contract, which relate to their professional honesty, solvency and reliability. That provision leaves the application of all those cases of exclusion to the assessment of the Member States, as evidenced by the phrase may be excluded from participation in a contract', which appears at the beginning of that provision and makes express reference, in subparagraphs (e) and (f), to the provisions of national law.
22. Thus, as the Commission of the European Communities rightly pointed out, Article 29 itself lays down the only limits to the power of the Member States in the sense that they cannot provide for grounds of exclusion other than those mentioned therein. That power of the Member States is also limited by the general principles of transparency and equal treatment (see, inter alia, Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraphs 91 and 92, and Case C-421/01 Traunfellner [2003] ECR I-11941, paragraph 29).
23. Accordingly, Article 29 of the Directive does not provide in this field for uniform application of the grounds of exclusion mentioned therein at Community level, since the Member States may choose not to apply those grounds of exclusion at all and opt for the widest possible participation in procedures for the award of public contracts or to incorporate them into national law with varying degrees of rigour according to legal, economic or social considerations prevailing at national level. In that context the Member States have the power to make the criteria laid down in Article 29 of the Directive less onerous or more flexible.
24. As regards, first, the question whether subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive must be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which refers to the position of service providers who are not in compliance' with social security or tax obligations, that provision enables Member States to exclude any candidate who has not fulfilled obligations' relating to the payment of social security contributions and taxes in accordance with [national] legal provisions'.
25. That provision does not contain a definition of has not fulfilled obligations'. In the light of the considerations set out in paragraph 23 of this judgment, the authors of the Directive did not intend to give that concept an autonomous Community definition, but referred to national rules for that purpose. It is therefore for national rules to specify the content and scope of the obligations at issue and the conditions for their fulfilment.
26. The Italian legislature has made use of the power given to it under subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive, by inserting the two grounds of exclusion in question into Article 12(d) and (e) of Legislative Decree No 157/1995. However, the national court asks, first of all, whether, by using the terms who are not in compliance in respect of obligations...', that provision is more permissive and whether it gives more latitude to the national authorities compared with the wording in subparagraphs (e) and (f) of Article 29 of the Directive.
27. As the parties concerned who submitted observations to the Court have rightly observed, the words non abbia adempiuto' its obligations or non sia in regola con' its obligations (both expressions being rendered as has not fulfilled obligations' in English) are both used indiscriminately in the various Community directives on public procurement. For example, Article 24(e) and (f) of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 54), Article 20(1)(e) and (f) of Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 1) and, finally, Article 45(2)(e) and (f) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), which entered into force on 31 January 2006. There is not, therefore, any difference in content between the two expressions at issue.
28. On the basis of those considerations it is appropriate to consider the various situations to which the national court refers. | C-226/04 & C-228/04
Cascina | 29-33 | S2-29.1.e+f | 29. The national court asks, secondly, whether, in order to have fulfilled his obligations relating to social security contributions and taxes, the service provider must, when the period prescribed for submitting requests to participate in a public tendering procedure expires or in any event before the award of the contract', have made the relevant payment in full and in time'.
30. In order to establish the time at which to determine whether the candidate has fulfilled his obligations it should be observed that subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive refer to the legal provisions of the Member States in order to determine the meaning of the expression fulfilled obligations', and that the Community legislature did not wish to make the application of that article uniform at Community level; it is logical to find that in order to establish the relevant time reference should also be made to national provisions.
31. It is, therefore, for national rules to determine the date by which or the period within which the persons concerned must have made the payments corresponding to their obligations or, as regards the other situations contemplated by the national court which are dealt with in paragraphs 34 to 39 of this judgment, must have proved that the conditions for subsequent regularisation have been fulfilled. That period may be, inter alia, the final date for lodging the request to participate in the contract, the date on which the invitation to tender was sent, the final date on which the candidates' tenders are to be lodged, the date on which tenders are considered by the contracting authority or even immediately prior to the award of the contract.
32. It should be stated, however, that the principles of transparency and equal treatment which govern all procedures for the award of public contracts, according to which the substantive and procedural conditions concerning participation in a contract must be clearly defined in advance, require that the period be determined with absolute certainty and made public in order that the persons concerned may know exactly the procedural requirements and be sure that the same requirements apply to all candidates. That period may be fixed by national legislation or the latter may confer that responsibility on the contracting authorities.
33. Therefore, a candidate is regarded as having fulfilled its obligations if, within the period referred to in paragraph 31 above, he has made all the payments relating to his social security or tax debts, subject to the cases of subsequent regularisation or bringing of administrative or legal proceedings, which are dealt with in paragraphs 34 to 39 of this judgment. Merely commencing payment at the relevant time, proof of intention to pay or proof of financial capacity to regularise the position after that time are not sufficient, in order to avoid infringing the principle of equal treatment of candidates. | C-226/04 & C-228/04
Cascina | 29-33 | S2-29.1.e+f | 29. The national court asks, secondly, whether, in order to have fulfilled his obligations relating to social security contributions and taxes, the service provider must, when the period prescribed for submitting requests to participate in a public tendering procedure expires or in any event before the award of the contract', have made the relevant payment in full and in time'.
30. In order to establish the time at which to determine whether the candidate has fulfilled his obligations it should be observed that subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive refer to the legal provisions of the Member States in order to determine the meaning of the expression fulfilled obligations', and that the Community legislature did not wish to make the application of that article uniform at Community level; it is logical to find that in order to establish the relevant time reference should also be made to national provisions.
31. It is, therefore, for national rules to determine the date by which or the period within which the persons concerned must have made the payments corresponding to their obligations or, as regards the other situations contemplated by the national court which are dealt with in paragraphs 34 to 39 of this judgment, must have proved that the conditions for subsequent regularisation have been fulfilled. That period may be, inter alia, the final date for lodging the request to participate in the contract, the date on which the invitation to tender was sent, the final date on which the candidates' tenders are to be lodged, the date on which tenders are considered by the contracting authority or even immediately prior to the award of the contract.
32. It should be stated, however, that the principles of transparency and equal treatment which govern all procedures for the award of public contracts, according to which the substantive and procedural conditions concerning participation in a contract must be clearly defined in advance, require that the period be determined with absolute certainty and made public in order that the persons concerned may know exactly the procedural requirements and be sure that the same requirements apply to all candidates. That period may be fixed by national legislation or the latter may confer that responsibility on the contracting authorities.
33. Therefore, a candidate is regarded as having fulfilled its obligations if, within the period referred to in paragraph 31 above, he has made all the payments relating to his social security or tax debts, subject to the cases of subsequent regularisation or bringing of administrative or legal proceedings, which are dealt with in paragraphs 34 to 39 of this judgment. Merely commencing payment at the relevant time, proof of intention to pay or proof of financial capacity to regularise the position after that time are not sufficient, in order to avoid infringing the principle of equal treatment of candidates. | C-226/04 & C-228/04
Cascina | 34-39 | S2-29.1.e+f | 34. Thirdly, the national court's reference is essentially concerned with whether it is compatible with subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive for a national rule or administrative practice which enables service providers, for the purpose of being admitted to a procedure for the award of a public contract, subsequently to regularise their position as regards tax and social security pursuant to leniency measures or a tax amnesty adopted by the Member State at issue or pursuant to an administrative arrangement of payment by instalment or debt relief.
35. It must be observed in that regard that, as the Advocate General rightly stated in point 29 of his Opinion, the amount and the date on which tax and social security obligations are due are defined by national law. Similarly, it was stated in paragraph 25 above that it is also for national law to determine the content and scope of has fulfilled obligations'. Moreover, the relevant period in that regard is that fixed by national law, as stated in paragraph 31 of this judgment.
36. Accordingly, a national law or administrative practice according to which, in the event of leniency measures or a tax amnesty or as a result of an administrative arrangement, the candidates concerned are regarded as being in compliance with their obligations for the purpose of being admitted to a procedure for the award of a contract is not incompatible with subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29, provided that in the period referred to in paragraph 31 of this judgment they can provide evidence that they have benefited from leniency measures, a tax amnesty or an administrative arrangement in respect of their debts.
37. The national court's reference concerns lastly the effects to be attributed to a candidate's bringing administrative or legal proceedings against the findings of the competent tax or social security authorities in order to establish whether the candidate is in compliance with his obligations with a view to his admission to a procedure for the award of a public contract.
38. It must be held that the reference to national law under subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive is also applicable in respect of that question. Nevertheless, the effects of bringing administrative or legal proceedings are closely linked to the exercise and safeguard of fundamental rights in relation to judicial protection, respect for which is also guaranteed by the Community legal order. National legislation which paid no heed to the effects of bringing administrative or legal proceedings on the opportunity to participate in a procedure for the award of a contract would risk infringing the fundamental rights of the parties concerned.
39. Taking account of that limitation, it is therefore for national law to determine whether bringing administrative or legal proceedings has effects which require the contracting authority to take the view that the candidate concerned is in compliance with his obligations, pending a final decision, for the purpose of his admission to the procedure for the award of a contract, provided that such proceedings are brought within the period referred to in paragraph 31 of this judgment. | C-226/04 & C-228/04
Cascina | 40 | S2-29.1.e+f | 40. Therefore, the answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling must be that subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive do not preclude a national law or administrative practice according to which a service provider, who has not fulfilled obligations relating to social security contributions and taxes by having paid in full when the period prescribed for submitting the request to participate in the contract expires, may subsequently regularise his position - pursuant to a tax amnesty or leniency measures adopted by the State, or - pursuant to an administrative arrangement of payment in instalments or debt relief, or - by bringing administrative or legal proceedings, provided that, within the period prescribed by national law or administrative practice, he provides evidence that he has benefited from such measures or arrangement or that he has brought such proceedings within that period. | C-71/92
Spain | 56+59 | W1-23.1.d+g | It should be borne in mind that, as the Court has stated in paragraph 45 of this judgment, Directive 71/305 entitles contractors to furnish proof of their capacity either by the means referred to in Articles 23 to 26 of the directive or by their registration in an official list of recognized contractors, which need not necessarily be that of the State in which the contract is to be awarded. The exercise of that right is impaired by a provision such as Article 341 of the RGCE, which makes it possible to exempt only contractors registered in such a list from giving provisional security.
As the Commission has correctly stated, subparagraphs (d) and (g) of the first paragraph of Article 23 of Directive 71/305, which make it possible to exclude from participation in a contract any contractor who has been guilty of grave professional misconduct or has been guilty of serious misrepresentation with regard to the criteria laid down for qualitative selection, provide the authorities awarding contracts with sufficient means to ensure, with the same effectiveness as classification itself or the threat of its suspension, the performance of the contracts concluded. There is therefore no need to restrict the grant of the exemption in question to those contractors who have furnished proof of their capacity by classification in Spain. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | N-071219
HIQ Wise | 1-9+K1 | C3-2.noncom-impl
C3-45.2.1
C3-45.3 | Ad påstand 1
1. Indklagede stillede i udbudsbekendtgørelsen krav om, at ansøgere om prækvalifikation ikke var omfattet af udelukkelsesgrundene i Udbudsdirektivets art. 45 stk. 2.
2. Som dokumentation krævede indklagede, for så vidt angår de i art. 45 stk. 2 e) og f) nævnte udelukkelsesgrunde om skatterestancer og restancer med sociale bidrag, en erklæring på tro og love eller en aktuel serviceattest fra Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen. Bestemmelsen må forstås således, at ansøgerne om prækvalifikation havde valget mellem de to nævnte former for dokumentation. Klageren valgte at præstere dokumentationen i form af en tro og love erklæring.
3. Desuden stillede indklagede i udbudsbekendtgørelsen krav om en serviceattest fra Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, som attesterer, at ansøgere om prækvalifikation ikke er omfattet af udelukkelsesgrundene i art. 45 stk. 2 eller – hvis sådan erklæring ikke kunne fremskaffes inden ansøgningsfristens udløb - den dokumentation, der er nævnt i Udbudsdirektivets artikel 45 stk.3.
4. Under hensyn til den udtrykkelige bestemmelse om, at dokumentation med hensyn til skatterestancer og restancer med sociale bidrag kunne gives ved en erklæring på tro og love, må udbudsbekendtgørelsen fortolkes således, at kravet om serviceattest eller anden dokumentation som nævnt i artikel 45 stk.3 alene vedrørte de i artikel 45 stk.2, a), b) og c) nævnte udelukkelsesgrunde, og at en erklæring på tro og love ikke var tilstrækkelig dokumentation for, at ansøgere om prækvalifikation ikke var omfattet af disse udelukkelsesgrunde.
5. Efter artikel 45 stk. 3 kan dokumentation præsteres i form af erklæringer fra offentlig myndighed. Typisk indhentes en serviceattest fra Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen. Som grundlag for udstedelse af serviceattester koordinerer Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen indsamlingen af oplysninger fra andre offentlige myndigheder. Det er herved gjort nemt for ansøgere om prækvalifikation, idet de kan benytte én indgang til det offentlige.
6. I den foreliggende sag har ansøgere om prækvalifikation udtrykkeligt fået mulighed for i tilfælde, hvor serviceattest ikke kunne fremskaffes inden ansøgningsfristens udløb, at indhente oplysningerne direkte fra de relevante offentlige myndigheder, dog med den lempelse, at indhentning af oplysninger fra offentlig myndighed om restancer vedrørende sociale bidrag og skat kan erstattes af en erklæring på tro og love.
7. For fuldstændighedens skyld bemærkes, artikel 45 stk. 3 sidste afsnit om beedigede erklæringer ikke er relevant i Danmark, da der er adgang til at få de ønskede erklæringer fra offentlig myndighed.
8. Klageren har herefter været forpligtet til at fremskaffe erklæringer fra offentlige myndigheder i henhold til art. 45 stk. 3 om de i art. 45 stk. 2, a), b) og c) nævnte udelukkelsesgrunde. Da sådanne erklæringer ikke er præsteret, har indklagedes afvisning af klagers kvalifikationsansøgning været berettiget.
9. Påstanden tages derfor ikke til følge.
.....
K1. Ad påstand 1 og 2 Klagen vedrørende disse påstande tages ikke til følge.
[Påstand 1 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med princippet om ligebehandling i Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 ved den 28. september 2006 at beslutte ikke at prækvalificere klageren med den begrundelse, at klagerens anmodning ikke opfyldte kravene i 2. afsnit i udbudsbekendtgørelsens afsnit III, 2.1 »De økonomiske aktørers personlige forhold, herunder krav om optagelse i erhvervs- eller handelsregister«, uagtet klageren havde opfyldt kravene i 2. afsnit ved som bilag 1 til anmodningen om prækvalifikation at have afgivet en erklæring på tro - og love om de forhold, der er omhandlet i 2. afsnit.] | N-061214
Baxter | 4-12+K1 | C3-2
C3-2.noncom-impl
C3-44.1-impl
C3-45.2.1 | Ad påstand 2-3
4. De indklagede har ikke fastsat, at tilbudsgiverne gennem f.eks. serviceattest fra Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen skal dokumentere ikke at have forfalden, ubetalt gæld til det offentlige, jf. Udbudsdirektivets artikel 45, stk. 3, litra b, jf. stk. 2, litra f. Et sådant krav ville utvivlsomt tjene til at opfylde det bagvedliggende formål med at sikre sig oplysninger om tilbudsgivernes økonomiske soliditet. Direktivets artikel 45, stk. 2, er imidlertid fakultativ, og det er således ikke en overtrædelse af bestemmelsen, at de indklagede har valgt at sikre sig på anden måde.
5. Det følger af lovbekendtgørelse nr. 336 af 13. maj 1997 § 1, stk. 1, at en ordregiver i udbudsbekendtgørelsen eller i udbudsbetingelserne skal kræve, at tilbudsgiverne afgiver en erklæring på tro og love om forfalden, ubetalt gæld til det offentlige. Af lovbekendtgørelsens § 1, stk. 2, fremgår, at tilbud fra en tilbudsgiver, der ikke har afgivet den nævnte gældserklæring, ikke må antages. Manglende overholdelse af de nævnte bestemmelser kan straffes med bøde.
6. Bortset fra klageren har ingen af de øvrige afgivet særskilte erklæringer, og klagerens erklæring indeholder ikke ordene »på tro og love«.
7. I udbudsbekendtgørelsen er der i overensstemmelse med lovbekendtgørelsen fastsat krav om tro og love erklæring, mens det derimod i udbudsbetingelserne er fastsat, at underskriften på tilbudene anses for at være en bekræftelse på, at tilbudsgiveren ikke har ubetalt, forfalden gæld til det offentlige. De indklagede har således i udbudsbetingelserne fraveget det krav, der var fastsat i udbudsbekendtgørelsen om i overensstemmelse med lovbekendtgørelsens § 1, stk. 1, at kræve en tro og love erklæring, og de har følgelig heller ikke afvist tilbud uden en særskilt erklæring, jf. § 1, stk. 2.
8. At manglende overholdelse af de nævnte bestemmelser kan straffes med bøde, har ikke betydning for Klagenævnets vurdering af de udbudsretlige konsekvenser.
9. Uoverensstemmelsen mellem udbudsbekendtgørelsens krav om tro og love erklæring og udbudsbetingelserne på dette punkt er i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 om gennemsigtighed.
10. I dette omfang tages påstand 2 til følge.
11. De indklagede har dog ikke – sådan som udbudsbetingelserne er fastsat - været forpligtet til at afvise de 4 tilbud.
12. Påstand 3 tages derfor ikke til følge.
.....
K1. Ad påstand 2 De indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 ved i udbudsbekendtgørelsen at stille krav om afgivelse af lovpligtig erklæring på tro og love vedrørende forfalden, ubetalt gæld til det offentlige, men i udbudsbetingelsernes punkt 28 og 29 at angive, at tilbudsgiver alene med sin underskrift på tilbudet skal bekræfte ikke at have ubetalt, forfalden gæld til det offentlige, jf. Lov nr. 336 af 13. maj 1997.
[Påstand 2 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at de indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 og artikel 45, stk. 3, litra b, jf. artikel 44, stk. 1, ved i udbudsbekendtgørelsen at stille krav om afgivelse af lovpligtig erklæring på tro og love vedrørende forfalden, ubetalt gæld til det offentlige, men i udbudsbetingelsernes pkt. 28 og 29 at angive, at tilbudsgiver alene med sin underskrift på tilbuddet skal bekræfte ikke at have ubetalt, forfalden gæld til det offentlige, jf. Lov nr. 336 af 13. maj 1997.
Påstand 3 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at de indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2, og artikel 45, stk. 2, litra e og f, jf. artikel 44, stk. 1, ved at have undladt at afvise tilbudene fra Terumo Sweden AB, Vingmed Danmark A/S og Pall Norden AB, uanset at disse tilbud ikke indeholdt den i udbudsbekendtgørelsen krævede erklæring på tro og love om gæld til det offentlige.] | N-990917
Dansk Fjernvarmes Decentrale | 1-5 | S2-3.2-impl
S2-29 | 1. Denne sag vedrører spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt indklagede under det aktuelle udbud var forpligtet til at tage anmodningen om prækvalifikation fra klagerne i betragtning, fordi der ikke efter Tjenesteydelsesdirektivets artikel 29 var grundlag for at udelukke dem, eller om indklagede var berettiget til at undlade at tage anmodningen om prækvalifikation fra klagerne i betragtning, fordi der forelå helt konkrete omstændigheder, som indebar, at indklagede havde en saglig grund til at undlade at tage denne anmodning i betragtning.
2. Energistyrelsens etablering af ordningen med teknisk og økonomisk bistand til barmarkskraftvarmeværkerne (Totalrådgivning til barmarkskraftvarmeværkerne) skete i sammenhæng med den tilvejebringelse af økonomisk bistand til barmarkskraftvarmeværkerne, som naturgasselskaberne efter anmodning fra Miljø– og Energiministeren og efter forhandling med Danske Fjernvarmeværkers Forening og Foreningen Danske Kraftvarmeværker gennemførte i begyndelsen af 1999. Energistyrelsen har ikke nogen direkte indflydelse på, hvorledes de midler, som naturgasselskaberne har stillet til rådighed for barmarkskraftvarmeværkerne, anvendes, men under hensyn til, at det i § 8, stk. 1, i Forretningsorden for Barmarkspuljen af 16. februar 1999 er bestemt, at der af Barmarkspuljen alene kan ydes økonomisk tilskud til barmarkskraftvarmeværker, der som led i Energistyrelsens totalrådgivningsordning er blevet gennemgået af en konsulent, og at tildelingen af midler først kan ske, når der foreligger en rådgivningsrapport, som kan danne grundlag for tildelingen, er der på denne måde for Energistyrelsen tilvejebragt en mulighed for indirekte at sikre sig, at de økonomiske midler, som naturgasselskaberne stiller til rådighed for barmarkskraftvarmeværkerne, bliver anvendt på en hensigtsmæssig måde.
3. Det følger heraf, at Energistyrelsen med henblik på, at de tekniske– og økonomiske rapporter, der skal udarbejdes vedrørende hvert enkelt barmarkskraftvarmeværk, bliver af så høj teknisk/økonomisk kvalitet som muligt, under udbudet har været berettiget til at vurdere, om der vedrørende nogen af de virksomheder. der ønskede at blive prækvalificeret, forelå omstændigheder, som kunne indebære en ikke fjerntliggende risiko for, at den pågældende virksomhed ved udarbejdelsen af sine rapporter ville tilgodese andre hensyn end rent faglige teknisk/økonomiske synspunkter.
4. På den anførte baggrund finder Klagenævnet, at indklagedes beslutning om ved prækvalifikationen ikke at tage anmodningen fra klagerne i betragtning var sagligt velbegrundet, og at indklagede – uanset at der ikke efter artikel 29 var grundlag for at udelukke klagerne – derfor var berettiget til at undlade at tage klagernes anmodning i betragtning. Klagenævnet lægger herved vægt på, at 2 af medlemmerne af bestyrelsen for Dansk Fjernvarmes Decentrale Kraft/Varme–Selskab A.m.b.a. efter vedtægterne udpeges af en interesseorganisation med tilknytning til branchen, nemlig Danske Fjernvarmeværkers Forening, hvilket i sig selv kan indebære en risiko for, at andre end rent teknisk/økonomiske hensyn kan påvirke rapporter udarbejdet af det konsortium, som andelsselskabet deltager i. Hertil kommer, at interesseorganisationen Danske Fjernvarmeværkers Forening tillige udpeger et medlem af Barmarkspuljens styregruppe, som netop skal anvende disse rapporter som grundlag for sine beslutninger om tildeling af midler fra puljen. Endelig bistår en person, som er ansat hos interesseorganisationen Danske Fjernvarmeværkers Forening, Barmarkspuljens styregruppe, således at han i forbindelse hermed har mulighed for at få indflydelse på udarbejdelsen af indstillinger til styregruppen.
5. Indklagede har således ikke ved at undlade at tage anmodningen fra det konsortium, som består af klagerne, i betragtning handlet i strid med EU– udbudsreglerne, og klagernes påstand 1 tages således ikke til følge. Det følger heraf, at heller ikke påstand 2 og påstand 3 tages til følge.
[Påstand 1. Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Tjenesteydelsesdirektivets artikel 3, stk. 2, ved under indklagedes udbud vedrørende totalrådgivning til barmarkskraftvarmeværkerne i forbindelse med prækvalifikationen ikke at tage anmodningen om prækvalifikation fra konsortiet bestående af klagerne i betragtning.
Påstand 2. Klagenævnet skal annullere indklagedes beslutning af 22. februar 1999 om ikke at tage konsortiet bestående af klagerne i betragtning ved prækvalifikationen.
Påstand 3. Klagenævnet skal annullere indklagedes beslutning af 4. juni 1999 om at indgå kontrakt med Carl Bro A/S og Cowi Rådgivende Ingeniører A/S.] | N-990604-2
BCP | 1 | G2-na [C3-2.contact]
G2-20.1-impl
G2-24-impl | 1. Det af indklagede stillede krav vedrørende »Virksomhedens særlige forhold « fremgik, dels af selve spørgeskemaet, dels af den skrivelse, hvormed det fremsendtes til klageren. Da klageren ikke medsendte den fornødne dokumentation vedrørende »Virksomhedens særlige forhold«, er klageren med føje udelukket fra den pågældende prækvalifikation.
[Sagsfresmtillingen: Klageren har nedlagt påstand om, at Klagenævnet skal fastslå, at indklagede har handlet i strid med udbudsreglerne ved at have fravalgt klageren som tilbudsgiver i forbindelse med udbudt rammekontrakt for datamater alene under henvisning til, at klageren ikke har fremsendt dokumentation vedrørende konkurs, likvidation, konkursbehandling og faglig hæderlighed samt om at Klagenævnet skal annullere den ulovlige beslutning og pålægge indklagede at lovliggøre udbudsforretningen.
.....
Indklagede har til støtte for påstanden om frifindelse gjort gældende, at udelukkelsen, selv om den er sket på et formelt grundlag, var korrekt. Der er efter direktivets artikel 24 snævre rammer for, hvor megen »efterfølgende aktivitet« en udbyder kan udvise uden at krænke princippet om lige behandling at tilbudsgiverne. Der er ikke efter bestemmelsen nogen ret til for en leverandør til efter opfordring fra udbyderen at råde bod på fejl og forsømmelser.] | N-990604
Acer | 1 | G2-na [C3-2:]
G2-20.1-impl
G2-24-impl | 1. Det af indklagede opstillede dokumentationskrav fremgår med al tydelighed af bl.a. det til klageren fremsendte spørgeskema. Idet det alene beror på klagerens eget forhold, at dokumentationskravet ikke rettidigt opfyldtes, tages klagen ikke til følge.
[Sagsfremstillingen: Klageren udfyldte det i skrivelsen nævnte spørgeskema, indsendte dette i udfyldt stand rettidigt til indklagede, men havde overset kravet om, at oplysninger om, at virksomheden ikke er under konkurs m.v., skulle dokumenteres f.eks. ved en såkaldt »serviceattest« udstedt af Erhvervs– og Selskabsstyrelsen, hvorfor indklagede ved skrivelse af 3. februar 1999 meddelte klageren, at virksomheden ikke kunne indgå i udvælgelsen af kvalificerede tilbudsgivere, da der ikke forelå den krævede dokumentation vedrørende virksomhedens forhold. Uanset, klageren ved skrivelse af 4. februar 1999 overfor indklagede beklagede den skete fejl og den 17. februar 1999 til indklagede fremsendte serviceattesten udstedt den 16. februar 1999, fastholdt indklagede afgørelsen.] |
|
|
